131 lines
5.4 KiB
Markdown
131 lines
5.4 KiB
Markdown
# Evaluation of secret management schemes
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2024-12-03 Robert, Nicolas, Valentin
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## Requirements
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- Store and manage secrets in a central place
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- Must be able to rotate keys (some state management)
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- Minimal state on contributors' end, ideally exactly one per-user credential or even SSO
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## Non-requirements
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- Don't need (or need only very basic) RBAC, all contributors are equal (maybe infra admins have special access)
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- Components which require secrets don't have to be a secret (this would be a requirement for personal setups, where we don't want to leak e.g. which accounts exist)
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- No need to retrieve secrets for very old versions
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- No need for forward secrecy (thoroughly destroying keys as required by e.g. secure messaging protocols)
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## Design considerations
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- Storing secrets
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Some secrets need to be persisted, and there are multiple formats and technologies to do that.
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- Managing secrets
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Secrets need to be shared with contributors, and changed or rotated.
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Different systems have different degrees of comfort for these operations.
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- Deploying secrets
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Secrets need to be made available to programs and services.
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- Versioning
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For key rotation we need at least two versions: old to access the machine, new for rotating in
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- Setup complexity
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Different systems have different requirements to get going, and may require more or less manual intervention for new contributors. This distinguishes:
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- complexity to set up for experts
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- complexity to contribute as a beginner
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- Scalability, sustainability
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Questions to consider:
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- What if a contributor works on 100 such projects?
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- What if a project has 100 contributors?
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- What if a project runs over 10 years, how much effort does secret handling incur?
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- What if someone messes up the central server?
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- How fast can we set up a working system?
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- How hard is it to migrate from one scheme to another?
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## Overview
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|Name|management|deployment|storage|versioning|setup|scalability|
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|[agenix]|yes (CLI)|yes (tempfiles)|repo ([age])|Git|[partially manual](#agenix-setup)|[details](#agenix-scalability)|
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|[sops-nix]|yes (CLI)|yes (tempfiles)|repo ([SOPS])|Git|[partially manual](#sops-nix-setup)|[more moving parts than agenix](#sops-nix-scalability)|
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|[Vaultwarden]|yes (web GUI)|no|database|yes, on demand|[details](#Vaultwarden-setup)|[more up-front effort](#Vaultwarden-scalability)|
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|ssh/scp|yes (manual) |yes (manual)|per-user|manually|[details](#sshscp-setup)|[details](#sshscp-scalability)|
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[agenix]: https://github.com/ryantm/agenix
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[age]: https://github.com/FiloSottile/age
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[sops-nix]: https://github.com/Mic92/sops-nix
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[SOPS]: https://github.com/getsops/sops
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[LoadCredential]: https://systemd.io/CREDENTIALS/
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[Vaultwarden]: https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden
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## Details on setup complexity
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### agenix setup
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- include module into configuration
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- manage per-user ssh public keys
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- each user needs to manage their public keys manually
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### sops-nix setup
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- include module into configuration
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- manage per-user ssh public keys
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- each user needs to manage their public keys manually
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### Vaultwarden setup
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- deploy Vaultwarden, set up backups
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- manage per-user authentication with Vaultwarden
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### ssh/scp setup
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- each contributor has to manage private keys and ssh config manually
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- have to take care of distribution of secrets and deployment separately
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## Details on scalability
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### agenix scalability
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- allows reusing ssh key workflows
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### sops-nix scalability
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- some extra complexity due to multiple encryption schemes
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- allows reusing ssh key workflows
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- some additional local setup for contributors
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### Vaultwarden scalability
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- allows reusing password handling workflows (typically better automation than for ssh keys)
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- more up-front work for initial deployment
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- disaster recovery needs special care, doesn't implicitly distribute copies to contributors
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- less interaction for managing contributor access
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- separate source of truth (workflows, audit log, etc.) as opposed to everything in the Git repo
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- adds an extra security boundary; encrypted secrets are not world-readable
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### ssh/scp scalability
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- requires taking care of distributing keys
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- per-user key management typically not automated, requires taking care of that separately
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## Additional notes
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- Managing the interface between public confiuration and secrets is a concern of the code
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- For a scalable setup you want something like modules that take secrets as settings
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- It is possible to split the git-stored secret schemes into private repositories
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- Then you have to handle synchronisation, e.g. by importing the public part from the secret part
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- This would incur extra overhead for managing access, but that would be the same workflow as managing access to the rest of the Git server
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- With secrets stored in Git there's a potential for running into merge conflicts, which can be avoided but requires extra care
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- Probably you want a monorepo for the entire organisation
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- Separating public and private parts through git subtrees is possible but requires even more care and automation/tooling when managing outside contributions
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- The upfront effort may be similar (but different in nature) to deploying and maintaining a Vaultwarden server
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- There's an experience and skill issue involved in maintaining a sophisticated Git repo or a live server, and what is more appropriate will depend on who will be responsible for the setup long-term |